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JURISDICTION
This Appeal is filed pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the trial court err in ruling as a matter of law that the
Utah Dram Shop Act (Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended)) applies only to commercial hosts in a commercial setting
and does not apply to a social host supplying alcoholic beverages
in a social setting?
Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint by ruling there is no common law action in favor
of an injured person against an individual supplier of alcohol?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, and denial of the plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Complaint, the appellate court must liberally construe facts and
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion,

and

is

free

to

reappraise

the

trial

court's

legal

conclusions, since the court's summary judgment and denial of
plaintiff's Motion to Amend were granted as a matter of law.

GGA,

Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989); Lucky 7 Rodeo
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988); Utah State Coalition
of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Company, 776 P.2d 632

(Utah App.- 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rules 15 and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

Section

A reproduction

of the entire statute and applicable rules is contained in the
addendum hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose out of an automobile accident occurring on
April 26, 1986, wherein the plaintiff was injured as a result of
defendant Graham's vehicle colliding with her vehicle while the
plaintiff was parked in her own driveway.

Prior to the collision,

Graham and Wenkel had been consuming beer at Graham's residence
during the course of the evening.
Defendants Graham and Wenkel, worked together at Hill Air
Force

Base

convenience

and on
store

the night
on

their

in question

way

to

purchased his favorite brand of beer.

stopped

Graham's

more

beer which

Wenkel

a

where

local
each

At Graham's home, Wenkel

consumed all of the beer that he purchased.
Wenkel

home

at

proceeded

Graham then offered
to

consume

while

at

Graham's home.
At approximately 8:00 a.m., the following morning, Wenkel left
the Graham home to drive to his own residence.

In route, Wenkel's

vehicle jumped the curb near the plaintiff's home, and crashed into
the plaintiff while the plaintiff was seated in the vehicle in her
own driveway.

Wenkel's blood alcohol content at the time of the
2

accident was .19% by weight.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court of
Weber County, wherein the court granted defendant Graham's Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

ruling

that

the Utah

Dram

Shop

Act

as

contained in Section 32A-14-1 does not apply in a social setting,
and was intended to apply only to the commercial sale of alcoholic
beverages.

(R.

175).

September 28, 1989.
motion

to

amend

The

summary

judgment

was

entered

on

On November 21, 1989, the plaintiff filed a

her

complaint

seeking

to

negligence action against defendant Graham.

add

a

common

law

The case against co-

defendant Wenkel was still pending at the time plaintiff moved to
amend her complaint.

(R. 181).

The summary judgment in favor of the defendant Graham did not
become a final order of the court until the court entered its order
denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint on April 16, 1990.
In fact, an appeal of the court's summary judgment was initially
filed on October 25, 1989.

(R. 177).

On December 20, 1989,

defendant moved the Supreme Court for an order dismissing the
appeal for the reason that the action against co-defendant, Wenkel,
was still pending at the time of the initial appeal.
218-219).

(R. 211-213,

Subsequent to the October 25, 1989, Notice of Appeal,

the Supreme Court, on stipulation of counsel, remanded the appeal
to the trial court for the purpose of deciding the Plaintiff's
pending Motion to Amend Complaint in order to obtain a final order
3

from the trial court.
sequence of procedural

(R. 218).

During the

above-described

events, the case against co-defendant,

Wenkel, had been settled, but was not dismissed by the trial court
until February 14, 1990, pursuant to stipulation of counsel.

(R.

237-239).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah's

Dram

Shop

Act

applies

to

alcoholic beverages in a social setting.

social

hosts

supplying

The language of Utah's

Dram Shop Act and its history indicate that the act is intended to
apply to social hosts.

The Dram Shop Act is intended to regulate

any violation of the act in the providing of alcoholic beverages
to persons who, as a result of their intoxication, cause injury to
others.

The statute is not strictly limited to the commercial sale

or distribution of alcohol.
Public policy supports the application of Utah's Dram Shop Act
to social hosts since the act is remedial in nature.

The clear

intent of the Dram Shop Act is to provide third persons with a
remedy for injuries sustained as a result of the misuse or abuse
of alcohol, and to impose responsibility on those persons who
provide

alcohol

in

violation

of

the

statute.

Limiting

the

application of the Dram Shop Act to the commercial setting is to
completely disregard the remedial nature of the statute and the
statute's clear intent.
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Complaint to add a common law negligence action against defendant
4

Graham since the trend supports such an action and since amending
the complaint would not have prejudiced the defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BROAD LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT
CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE ACT IS INTENDED TO APPLY
TO SOCIAL HOSTS
Utah's original Dram Shop Act, formerly 32-11-1, Utah Code
Annotated, provided:
[A]ny person who gives, sells, or otherwise provides
intoxicating liquor to another contrary to . . . Section
32-7-14 or Section 32-7-24(b) or (c), and thereby causes
the intoxication of another person, is liable for
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any
third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of that
third person, resulting from the intoxication.
(2)
A person who suffers an injury referred to in
subsection (1) of this section shall have a cause of
action against the intoxicated person and the person
who provided the intoxicating liquor in violation of
subsection (1) above or either of them.
Defendant is wrong in his assertion that the history of the
act contains no mention of any regulation of the dispensing of
alcohol in a social setting, given the context of the former
statute prohibiting violations of Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24.
At the time the original dram

shop statute was enacted,

Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24 of the Utah Code regulated not only
sale and distribution of alcohol but also its possession and use.
Section 32-7-14 provided that "no person shall sell or supply any
alcoholic beverage or permit alcoholic beverages to be sold or
supplied to any person under or apparently under the influence of
5

alcohol".

Section 32-7-24 provided that "no person shall:

(a)

permit drunkenness to take place in any house or on any premises
of which he is the owner, tenant, or occupant; or (b) permit or
suffer any person apparently under the influence of liquor to
consume any liquor in any house or on any premises of which the
first named person is the owner, tenant, or occupant; or (c) give
any liquor to any person apparently under the influence of liquor".
The obvious intent of the original Dram Shop Act (Section 3211-1,

Utah

Code Annotated) was

to

regulate

any violation

of

Sections 32-7-14 or 32-7-24, which, in turn, regulated not only
the sale and distribution, but the possession and use of alcohol
in a social setting.
The present Dram Shop Act, originally enacted in 1985 and
subsequently

amended, uses essentially

the same

language when

imposing liability upon individuals who violate the provisions of
the

act.

Rather

than

refer

specifically

to other

statutory

references, such as the former Sections 32-7-14 and 32-7-24, the
statute in effect at the time of the court's summary judgment
provided:
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to
a person:
(a) who is under the age of twenty-one (21)
years, or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs, or
6

(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic
beverage knew or should have known from the
circumstances
was
under
the
influence
of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs, or
(d) who is a known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that
person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or
means of support to any third person, or to the spouse,
child, or parent of that third person resulting from the
intoxication. An employer is liable for the actions of
its employees in violation of this chapter.
(2)
A person who suffers an injury under
subsection (1) has a cause of action against the person
who provided the liquor or alcoholic beverage in
violation of subsection (1). (Section 32A-14-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1986).
In comparing the present statute with the former, the clear
language of the Act indicates that it applies to social hosts.
The only substantive changes in the statute relate to the inclusion
of a broader definition of intoxicating liquor to include "any
alcoholic

beverage,"

and

a stylistic

change

by

including

the

prohibited acts in the statute itself, rather than referring to
other statutes relating to the possession and use of alcohol.
(Compare Section 32-11-1; Section 32A-14-1, 1986 amendment; 32A14-101, 1990 amendment).

The amendment broadening the definition

of intoxicating liquor to include "any alcoholic beverage" was
effective on March 17, 1986, more than thirty (30) days before the
April 26, 1986, accident giving rise to this law suit.
In Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 34, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah
1988), a case involving the application of Utah's previous Dram
7

Shop Act (Utah Code Annotated Section 32-11-1, repealed 1985), the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the former Dram
Shop Act applied to a provider of light beer, when the plain
language of the statute only held that providers of "intoxicating
liquors" could be liable for injuries to persons caused by one
under the influence.

In Allisen, the plaintiff was struck by a

vehicle while crossing a street within minutes after the driver had
left the American Legion premises.

The American Legion filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Dram Shop Act
did not apply to the sale and consumption of light beer.

The trial

court denied the American Legion's motion to dismiss, but on appeal
this court ruled that since the Liquor Control Act in effect at the
time

(Utah

Code

Annotated

Section

32-1-3,

repealed

1985)

specifically excluded light beer from its definition of liquor, the
former Utah Dram Shop Act did not apply to providers of light beer.
Id. at 809.
The Allisen court further held that "where statutory language
is plain and unambiguous, this court will not look beyond to define
legislative intent." The Allisen court cited Johnson v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1988), in ruling that the
Supreme Court is guided by the rule that a statute should be
construed according to its plain language.

Allisen at 809.

In construing the plain language of the Dram Shop Act in
effect at the time of the accident giving rise to the present case,
it is clear that the Act did not limit its application to the
8

commercial setting.

The plain language of the statute provided:

"Any person who directly gives, sells, or
otherwise provides liquor, or at a location allowing
consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to
a person [in violation of the statute] and by those
actions causes the intoxication of that person, is
liable for injuries . . . to any third person . . .
resulting from the intoxication. (Section 32-14-1 Utah
Code Ann. 1986 amend., emphasis added).
Clearly, the "any person" language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous and must be construed to apply to the social, as well
as, the commercial setting.

Had the legislature intended that the

statute only apply to the commercial setting, the plain language
of the statute should have excluded the term "any person" and
included

terms

such

as

"seller",

"commercial

distributor

or

provider", "tavern", or such other terms strictly designed to limit
the application of the act to the commercial setting.

This court

has previously held that the best indicator of legislative intent
is the statute's plain
ambiguity

there

is

language, and that

nothing

to

construe.

in the
See

absence of
Jensen

v.

Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984); State v.
Archiletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974).

Clearly, there is

nothing ambiguous in the language of the 1986 Dram Shop Act.

The

term "any person" must, therefore, be broadly construed to include
social hosts as well as commercial providers of alcohol.
POINT II
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT
TO SOCIAL HOSTS SINCE THE ACT IS REMEDIAL IN NATURE
In

Williams

v.

Klemesrud,
9

197

N.W.2d

614

(1972

Iowa),

overruled on other grounds; Lewis v. State of Iowa, 256 N.W. 181,
(1977 Iowa), the Iowa Supreme Court refused to hold that the Dram
Shop Act applied only to those engaged in liquor traffic or sales.
The court ruled that such statutes were remedial or compensatory
in

nature

and,

therefore,

refused

to

adopt

rules

of

strict

construction which would limit the statute's scope and thus impair
the remedy and advance the mischief sought to be corrected.
Other

jurisdictions whose Dram

Shop Acts contain

similar

language to that contained in the Utah statute have ruled that dram
shop liability extends to the social host.

In Martin v. Watts, 508

So.2d 1136 (1987 Alabama), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a
statute which granted a person injured by an intoxicated person a
right of action against the person who provided the intoxicant in
violation of state law provided a cause of action against the
social host for injuries received as a result of an automobile
accident.

The court rejected the social host's contentions that

the statute applied only to commercial dispensers of alcohol since
the statute included the terms "giving" and "otherwise disposing
of."

The court further held*that it was hard to imagine a phrase

more expansive than "otherwise disposing of".
The Martin court also noted that the trend in recent decisions
of other jurisdictions was to allow causes of action where adults
had assisted in furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors.
1141.

Id. at

This same rationale justifies application of the Utah Dram

Shop Act to social hosts, given the similarity of the terminology
10

since the Utah Act imposes liability on any person who "gives" or
"otherwise provides" alcohol in violation of the statute.
The clear intent of Dram Shop liability is twofold:

(1)

provide a remedy to innocent third persons who suffer injury as a
result of the misuse and abuse of alcohol, and (2) impose some
responsibility on those persons who provide alcohol to individuals
in violation of the statute.

To say that social hosts should not

be held liable for irresponsibly providing alcohol to guests whom
they know, or should know, are under the influence of alcohol is
to completely disregard the remedial nature of the statute.
POINT 111
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO ADD A COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION.
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may amend his pleading only upon obtaining leave of the court
or by written consent of the adverse party.
provides

that

requires."

"leave

shall

be

freely

given

Rule 15 further
when

justice

so

At the time the plaintiff filed its original motion to

amend, the case against co-defendant, Wenkel, was still pending;
and, therefore, the court's summary judgment was not final.
181, 237-239).

(R.

Plaintiff's initial appeal was remanded to the

district court for purposes of deciding plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Complaint.

(R. 210-213, 218-220).

The court issued its order

denying plaintiff's motion ruling that "if it is deemed appropriate
at the procedural juncture of this case to move to amend the
complaint, the court is of the opinion that there is not a common
11

law cause of action running in favor of a person injured against
a person who supplied alcohol . . . ".

(R. 249). While the trial

court's order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is less
than clear, it appears on its face that the trial court denied
plaintiff's motion because the court was of the opinion there is
no common law action in favor of a injured person against a third
party supplier of alcohol.
Since

the

original

case

was

still

pending

at

the

time

plaintiff filed its original Motion to Amend, and was not dismissed
until February 14, 1990, none of the court's orders were final for
purposes of an appeal.

Baxtrum Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall,

751 P. 2d 1157 (Utah App. 1988), Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984).
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim,
or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination by
the court that there is no just reason for delay and
upon express direction for the entry of judgment. In
the absence of such determination and direction, any
order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims
or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all parties.
At the time of the plaintiff's initial appeal, defendant
Graham moved the Supreme Court for an order dismissing the original
12

appeal for the reason that the case involved multiple parties, and,
therefore, required certification of finality pursuant to Rule
54(b).

Given the language of Rule 54, it is difficult to imagine

how the courtfs .order of summary judgment in favor of defendant
Graham may be deemed a final judgment prohibiting the plaintiff
from amending its complaint to add a common law cause of action.
In considering motions to amend pleadings, this court has
ruled that determining factors include:

(1) lack of prejudice to

either party; and (2) whether the amendments were attempted prior
to trial.

Lewis v. Maultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981).

Given the

procedural posture of the case at the time plaintiff moved to
amend, there would have been no prejudice to the defendants in
allowing the amendment since the case had not yet gone to trial.
This being the case, there is no procedural reason upon which the
court's denial of plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint may be
based.
Since

there

Is

no

procedural

basis

for

the

denial

of

plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, it must be assumed that the
court has denied the plaintiff's Motion to Amend by ruling as a
matter of law that there is no common law cause of action in favor
of an injured person against a third party supplier of alcohol.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, a common law action for
negligent serving of alcohol is recognized in many states.
In Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626

(Ky. App. 1968),

the

Kentucky court of appeals held that an injured motorist had a valid
13

cause of action against a liquor store for negligently serving
alcohol to a minor.

In Rappaporfc v. Nichols,, 156 A. 2d 1 (NJ 1959),

the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a plaintiff could state
a

negligence

negligently

action

for

wrongful

death

against

a

bar

which

served alcohol to a minor who was involved in an

automobile accident that resulted in the death of the plaintiff's
decedent.
18,

Likewise, in Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d

(Mass. 1967), the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized a

common law negligence action against a bar that supplied alcohol
to a motorist who was later involved in an accident injuring the
plaintiff.

See also, Trail v. Christian, 213 N.W.2d 618 (Minn.

1973), Calligan v. Cousar, 187 N.E.2d 292 (111. 1963).
While the Utah Supreme Court has expressly refused to rule
whether there is a common law action for the negligent supply of
liquor, the modern trend suggests that an action ought to be
recognized.

Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806

(Utah 1988).

Preventing the destruction caused by intoxicated

drivers, and providing injured plaintiffs with adequate means of
redress against those who negligently supply or serve alcohol must
be a major consideration for the court in determining whether a
common law action for negligence ought to be recognized in Utah.
In light of the fact that other states have recognized such common
law

causes

of

action

in

an

effort

to

curb

the

effects

of

intoxicated drivers, this court should expressly adopt a negligence
action against individuals or entities which neqliqently supply or
14

serve alcohol.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant Graham on the
issue

of

Plaintiff

the

Dram

further

Shop

requests

Act's

application

that this Court

to

social

reverse

hosts.

the

trial

court's order denying plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint to
allow plaintiff to add a common law negligence cause of action
against defendant Graham.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

(Q

day of August, 1990.

/ • * /

ERIK M. WARD

IM.
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, this
[p day of August, 1990, to Paul N. Belnap and Brett G. Pearce,
attorneys for defendant Graham, at Strong & Hanni, Sixth Floor
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

HL
ERIK M. WARD

m.
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Section 32A-14-101, Utah Code Annotated
Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Annotated
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages —
Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or persons who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of action.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage,
to a person:
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or
(d) who is a known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication,, An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of
this chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (1).
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that
person's estate.
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one
occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within
two years after the date of the hyury.
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the iiyury.
History; C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, che 175, § 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 1986, added the
language in Subsection (1) following "or otherwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a)
through (lXd). the last sentence in Subsection (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); inserted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the

beginning; in Subsection (2), inserted "or
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor
stylistic changes,
Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effective date of this subsection," referred to in
Subsections (4) and (5), appears in Laws
1 9 8 6 f c L 1 7 7 f § 3f w h i c h b e c a m e e ff e c t i v e
March 17 1986.

32A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribution of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action —
Statute of limitations — Employee protections.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the
following persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person,
is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from
the intoxication:
(a) any person under the age of 21 years;
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs;
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage
knew or should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person.
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this
chapter.
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of
Subsection (1).
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate.
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter that arises after July 1, 1985 is
limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be
commenced within two years after the date of the injury.
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection
(1).
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated
against that employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set
forth in Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act..
History: C. 1953, 32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, } 1; 1986, ch. 177, § 3; 1989,
ch. 240, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, ch. 23,
i 178.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsection (7) and made minor stylistic changes.
The 1990 amendment, effective February 21,
1990, renumbered this section, which formerly
appeared as § 32A-14-1; transferred the language after "to the following persons" at the
end of the introductory paragraph in Subsection (1) from Subsection (l)(d); designated the
former final sentence in Subsection (l)(d) as

present Subsection (2); designated former Subsections (2) to (7) as present Subsections (3) to
(8); deleted "liquor or other* before "alcoholic
beverage" in present Subsection (3); substituted "July 1, 1985" for "the effective date of
this subsection" in present Subsection (5); deleted "which arises after the effective date of
this subsection" after "chapter" in present Subsection (6); substituted "airport lounge, private
club, on-premise beer retailer, or any other establishment" for "club, or any other facility" in
present Subsection (8)(a); and made changes in
phraseology and punctuation.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised-in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.

Rule 54, Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the -court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the cJourt that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
t

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN WENKEL and
ROBERT GRAHAM,

Case No.

870999559

Defendant.
The parties agree that for purposes of this motion, the
conduct

complained

of

arose

in

a

social

as

opposed

to a

commercial setting.
The Court is persuaded that the statute in question is
not intended to apply in a social setting and accordingly grants
defendant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

A/J6 day of September, 1989.

RULING
Sneddon v. Wenkel et al
Case No. 870999559
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^lgtt~ day of September,
1989 I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling
counsel as follows:
Erik M. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff
635 Twenty Fifth,Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Lynn S. Davies
Attorney for Defendant Wenkel
Key Bank Tower Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Paul M. Belnap
Attorney for Defendant Graham
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

Civil No. 99559
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the
defendant Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court

having reviewed the memoranda submitted in support of the motion
and in opposition to the motion, and having issued its Memorandum
Decision determining that the statutes in question were not
intended to apply in a social setting as found in this case, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant
Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that
the plaintiff's complaint against Robert Graham is hereby

dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant Graham.
DATED t h i s

J

day of Af^\^SLg jJkJLA^

, 1989

BY THE COURT:

M-,

Stanton M, Taylor
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this ^S7^

day of /&£/*-#

0j/

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment
was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Erik M. Ward
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
P. 0. BOX 1850
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84402
Lynn S. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Brett G. Pearce, #5220
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant,
Robert Graham
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff,
I

ORDER

V.

JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,
Defendants.

I

Civil NO. 870999559

]

Judge Stanton Taylor

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 12th
day of March, 1990, at the hour of 10:45 A.M. before the
Honorable Stanton Taylor, District Court Judge, on Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend complaint.
The plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record
and defendant Robert Graham was represented by his counsel of
record.
The court having previously granted Defendant's Motion
for summary Judgment and having entered its Summary Judgment
dated November 3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff

with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint
to "add a cause of action against the defendant, Robert Graham,
based upon a theory of common law negligence in supplying
intoxicating liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel."
A proposed amended complaint was not presented with the
motion, but counsel for plaintiff presented argument as to the
basis for the amended complaint.
Having reviewed the motion, and the memorandum in
opposition to the same, and having heard the argument of counsel
together with the procedural posture of the case, with the court
having previously dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, and the
court having indicated at the time of the hearing that if it is
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that
there is not a common law cause of action running in favor of a
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol, nor does
the court believe that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act afford to the plaintiff a cause of action
under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the

2-

p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion to Amend Complaint i s deniecL.
DATED t h i s

J'I

day of

, 1990.

$/11/AJS1

Distr^t /Cou
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 3c ^

day of

/7l/i.x,^J^

1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Erik M. Ward
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Lynn S. Pavies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

3-

